Abstract. Incidence calculus is a probabilistic logic in which incidences, standing for the situations in which formulae may be true, are assigned to some formulae, and probabilities are assigned to incidences. However, numerical values may be assigned to formulae directly without specifying the incidences. In this paper, we propose a method of discovering incidences under these circumstances which produces a unique output comparing with the large number of outputs from other approaches. Some theoretical aspects of this method are thoroughly studied and the completeness of the result generated from it is proved. The result can be used to calculate mass functions from belief functions in the Dempster-Shafer theory of evidence (DS theory) and define probability spaces from inner measures (or lower bounds) of probabilities on the relevant propositional language set.
Introduction
Incidence calculus [1, 2] is a probabilistic logic for dealing with uncertainty in intelligent systems. In incidence calculus, incidences are assigned to some formulae, and probabilities are assigned to incidences. An incidence is assigned to a formula if this formula is true when the incidence occurs. Incidences can be explained as the possible worlds relevant to a problem in logics, or all the possible outcomes of an event in probability theory. The probability of a formula is calculated through the set of incidences assigned to it.
Calculating probabilities of formulae through incidences results in the indirect assignment of numerical values on formulae. The initial assignment of incidences on some formulae (called axioms) plays a vital role in further propagating incidences to other formulae and obtaining their probabilities. It is proved in [3] that the indirect encoding in incidence calculus provides the possibility of combining dependent evidence, a problem which is difficult to solve in pure numerical approaches. However, in practice, numerical values may be assigned to some formulae directly without giving incidences, like the methods used in pure numeric reasoning theories, e.g., DS theory, probabilistic logic, and probability theory. It is, therefore, necessary to recover the incidence assignments (if they exist) from the given numerical assignment in these circumstances [4] .
In [5] , the task of assigning incidences was viewed as a tree searching problem and two techniques of performing this search were discussed. One of them was a depth first search while the other extended the Monte Carlo method, introduced initially in [6] . Both methods generate a number of consistent assignments of incidences, given a numerical assignment. In fact, these methods try to find all possible consistent assignments of incidences. Therefore, both of the programs are slow in terms of finding answers. Besides, they cannot be used in more general situations, represented using generalized incidence calculus theories, to which the original incidence calculus was extended [7] . In this paper, we discuss the incidence assignment problem in the situation where incidence calculus has been extended [7] . An alternative approach to assigning incidences from numerical assignments is explored. This approach is based on a new concept: basic incidence assignment. The significance of the new incidence assignment method is that it can determine whether a consistent assignment is available efficiently and then construct only one assignment, which is a basic incidence assignment. Through this core assignment, a family of consistent assignments can be generated. As there is only one possible output comparing with a large amount of output from other approaches, the new method is considerably faster then those in [5] . This result also gives a method to check whether a numerical assignment on a set is a belief function in DS theory [8, 9] and then to calculate its mass function when it is. The result can further be used to construct probability spaces from inner measures (or lower bounds) of probabilities on the relevant propositional language sets [10] .
Although our approach only produces a single output, a basic incidence assignment, it does not mean that we may have ignored any possible outcomes discovered by other methods. In [11] , the theoretical features of basic incidence assignment based approach were explored intensively. It is proved that incidence assignments discovered in our approach are more fundamental then incidence assignments obtained from other methods, and any output from other methods is subsumed by a unique output from our method.
Overall, this paper makes the following contributions regarding developing the original incidence calculus.
• The concept of basic incidence assignment is proposed which underlies the foundation for the new approach.
• The relationship between a basic incidence assignment and an incidence assignment is examined, which reveals the nature of similarities among apparently different incidence functions.
• An algorithm on incidence assignments from numerical assignments is designed and implemented.
• The theoretical foundation of this approach is examined in which the completeness of the result generated from the algorithm is proved.
• An algorithm is designed to check if a numerical assignment on a set is a belief function, and to obtain the corresponding mass function when it is.
• An algorithm is designed to recover the probability space from an inner measure on a propositional language set.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces some basic definitions used throughout the paper and the basics of the original incidence calculus. Section 3 describes the generalized incidence calculus theories, and proposes basic incidence assignments. Section 4 concentrates on the relationships between basic incidence assignments and incidence functions, to see how to find one from the other. In Section 5, an algorithm for obtaining the incidence assignment from a numerical assignment is discussed. Section 6 concentrates on exploring the theoretical nature of incidence assignments and discusses why a single output is enough to represent a number of incidence assignment, given a numerical assignment. The application of the result to DS theory and probability spaces is presented in Section 7. Finally, in Section 8 we summarize the paper.
The Original Incidence Calculus
We first give some basic definitions which will be used in the later sections, then introduce the original incidence calculus.
Basic Definitions Definition 2.1 (The Probability Space). A probability space (X, χ, µ) has
X : a sample space usually containing all the possible worlds; χ: a σ-algebra containing some subsets of X , which is defined as containing X and closed under complementation and countable union. µ: a probability measure µ : χ → [0, 1] with the following features:
A subset χ of χ is called a basis of χ if it contains nonempty and disjoint elements, and if χ consists precisely of countable unions of members of χ . For any finite χ there is a unique basis χ of χ and it follows that
Given a set X , when a probability distribution µ assigns a probability on every singleton x ∈ X , σ -algebra χ and the basis χ of χ are the same as X . The corresponding probability space is (X, X, µ).
Definition 2.2 (The Propositional Language).
• P is a finite set of atomic propositions.
• L(P) is the propositional language formed from P.
true, false ∈ L(P),
That is, L(P) is closed under the operations negation (¬), disjunction (∨), conjunction (∧) and implication (→).
Definition 2.3 (The Basic Element Set).
Assume that P is a finite set of propositions and P = {q 1 , q 2 , . . . , q n }. An item δ, defined as δ = q 1 ∧ · · · ∧ q n where q j is either q j or ¬q j , is called a basic element. The collection of all the basic elements, denoted as At, is called the basic element set from P. Any formula ψ in the language set L(P) can be represented as
The Original Incidence Calculus
Incidence calculus [1] is a logic for probabilistic reasoning. In incidence calculus, probabilities are not directly associated with formulae, rather sets of possible worlds are directly associated with formulae and probabilities (or lower and upper bounds of probabilities) of formulae are calculated from these sets.
Definition 2.4 (The Original Incidence Calculus Theories). An incidence calculus theory is a quintuple
W, µ, P, A, i ,
where
• W is a finite set of possible worlds.
• For all w ∈ W, µ(w) is the probability of w and µ(W) = 1, where µ(I ) = w∈I µ(w).
• P is a finite set of propositions. At is the basic element set of P. L(P) is the language set of P.
• A is a distinguished set of formulae in L(P) called the axioms of the theory.
• i is a function from the axioms in A to 2 W , the set of subsets of W. i(φ) is to be thought of as the set of possible worlds in W in which φ is true, i.e., i(φ) = {w ∈ W | w |= φ}. i (φ) is called the incidence set of φ.
i is extended to be a function from L(A) to 2 W by the following defining equations of incidences.
Such an incidence calculus theory is truth functional, i.e., the incidence set of a formula can be calculated purely from its parts.
For a formula in L(P)\L(A), the lower and upper bounds of its incidence set are defined as
The corresponding lower and upper bounds of probabilities of this formula are p
We say p(φ) is the probability of formula φ.
Example 2.1. Suppose there are three propositions, P = {sunny, rainy, windy}, and seven possible worlds, W = {sun, mon, tues, wed, thur, fri, sat}. Assume that each possible world is equally probable, i.e., occurs 1/7 of the time. Through a piece of evidence, we learn that four possible worlds fri, sat, sun, mon support rainy, and three possible worlds mon, wed, fri make windy true. Then the incidence sets of these two propositions are i(rainy) = { fri, sat, sun, mon}, i(windy) = {mon, wed, fri}.
The set of axioms A is {rainy, windy}. For every formula in L(A), it is possible to get its incidence set.
For instance, for formula ¬windy ∧ rainy, we have
For other formulae in L(P)\L(A), such as, sunny ∨ windy) ∧ ¬rainy = φ, we can only use Eqs. (1) and (2) to obtain its bounds. In this special case, i * (φ) = i(windy ∧ ¬rainy) = {wed} (as only i((windy ∧ ¬rainy) → φ) = W) and i * (φ) = {tues, wed, thur}
The result says that at least one day, but at most three days in that week, it is either sunny or windy but not rainy.
Generalized Incidence Calculus
In [3] and [7] , we argued that incidence calculus theories introduced in Section 2 can only be used to represent a special group of information which should specify incidence functions with truth functionality. Then we suggested to weaken the conditions on incidence functions in order to let incidence calculus represent a wider range of information. As a result, generalized incidence calculus theories (GICTs) are introduced to replace the original incidence calculus theories.
Definition 3.1 (Generalized Incidence Calculus Theories (GICTs)).
A generalized incidence calculus theory (GICT) is in the form of W, µ, P, A, i , where W, µ and P are the same as in Definition 2.4.
• A is a distinguished set of formulae in L(P) called the axioms of the theory on which incidences are assigned initially.
• i is a function from the axioms in A to 2 W , the set of subsets of W. i(φ) is to be thought of as the set of possible worlds in W in which φ is true. i(φ) is called the incidence set of φ. Function i satisfies the conditions
The condition i(φ ∧ ψ) = i(φ) ∧ i(ψ) requires that A is closed under the operation ∧. This condition is true whenever for any two formulae φ, ψ in A, i(φ), i(ψ) and i(φ ∧ ψ) are all defined. Because, if a possible world w supports φ ∧ ψ, w must also support both φ and ψ, so that i(φ ∧ ψ) ⊆ i(φ) ∩ i(ψ). On the other hand, if w supports both φ and ψ, then w supports φ ∧ ψ as well, so that
When A is not closed under ∧ initially, we can always extend it to be closed by defining i(φ ∧ ψ) = i(φ) ∩ i(ψ). Therefore, in the rest of the paper, we take A as a set closed under ∧. We also assume in the rest of the paper that true and false are always included in a set of axioms.
The function i in a GICT is also called an incidence function in the rest of the paper. Only when confusions may occur, we will make it clear whether i is an original incidence function, or a function in a GICT.
Similar to the situation in the original incidence calculus, it is not usually possible to infer the incidences of all the formulae in L(P), given a GICT. We can only define both the upper and lower bounds of the incidence set using the following equations.
where ψ |= φ iff ψ → φ = true. That is, formula ψ → φ is a tautology. In particular, for any φ ∈ A, we have i * (φ) = i(φ). The equations for calculating bounds here are slightly different from those defined in (1) and (2) . Equations (3) and (4) are more close to the similar concepts in other theories, such as the bounds of beliefs in the DS theory, and the inner and outer measures of probabilities on logical sentences in [10, 12] . The lower bound of an incidence set (Eq. (3)) represents the set of possible worlds in which φ is proved to be true and the upper bound (Eq. (4)) represents the set of possible worlds in which ¬φ fails to be proved. Function Prob * (φ) = µ(i * (φ)), the lower bound of a probability measure, gives the degree of our belief in φ and function Prob * (φ) = µ(i * (φ)), the upper bound of a probability measure, represents the degree we fail to believe in ¬φ. If for every formula φ in A, Prob * (φ) = Prob * (φ) holds, then Prob(φ) is defined as Prob * (φ) and is called the probability of this formula. In this case, a GICT is shrunk into an original incidence calculus theory. Otherwise, the probability of φ does not exist.
In the following, when we mention a lower bound of a probability distribution on A, we always mean the function Prob * ( * ) obtained through the lower bounds of incidence sets. Now we use an example to see how to apply generalized incidence calculus theories.
Example 3.1 (Originally from [10] and used in [13] ).
A person has four coats: two are blue with singlebreasted, one is grey and double-breasted and one is grey and single-breasted. To choose which color of coat to wear, this person tosses a (fair) coin. Once the color is chosen, which specific coat is worn is determined by a mysterious procedure. What is the probability of the person wearing a single-breasted coat?
To solve this problem in generalized incidence calculus, we need to construct a GICT first. We let a set of propositions P be P = {grey, double}, where grey stands for 'The coat is grey' and double stands for 'The coat is double-breasted' and let W = {w 1 , w 2 } where w 1 is for blue coats and w 2 for grey coats. Then we have At = {grey ∧ double, ¬grey ∧ double, grey ∧ ¬double, ¬grey ∧ ¬double}.
Among these basic elements, ¬grey ∧ double is false, as there is no such coat among the four choices. It is possible to derive that w 1 supports formula ¬grey ∧ ¬double and w 2 supports formula (grey ∧ ¬double) ∨ (grey ∧ double). Therefore, we get a GICT, W, µ, P, A, i , where
and
The answer to the question is that the probability of the person wearing a single-breasted coat lies between 0.5 and 1.
Basic Incidence Assignment
For each axiom φ ∈ A of a GICT W, µ, P, A, i , the incidence set i(φ) contains every possible world which makes φ true. If w ∈ i(ψ) and ψ |= φ (ψ = φ), then w makes φ true, and w ∈ i(φ). Assume that ψ 1 , . . . , ψ j ∈ A are all the axioms satisfying the condition ψ j |= φ (ψ j = φ), then i(φ)\ ∪ j i(ψ j ) may or may not be empty, depending on the specification of i. We are particularly interested in φ and those possible worlds in i(φ)\ ∪ j i(ψ j ), when it is not empty. What properties do these possible worlds possess? Clearly, the possible worlds in i(φ)\ ∪ j i(ψ j ) make only φ true without making any of ψ (ψ |= φ, ψ = φ) true. We denote this set as ii(φ). If we let A 0 contain all those axioms φ for which ii(φ) is not empty, then ii defines a function on axioms in A 0 . For other axioms, ψ, in A\A 0 , ii(ψ) = { }. This implies that i(ψ) is purely the union of the incidence sets of some other axioms ψ j , where ψ j |= ψ . That is, the set i(ψ) does not carry any extra information than that union.
Definition 3.2 (Defining a Function ii from i).
Assume that i is the incidence assignment from a GICT, W, µ, P, A, i , we define a new function ii on a subset of A, A 0 , from the following equation: 
Clearly, in a basic incidence assignment, each possible world w is only assigned to a specific axiom. ii(φ j ) (φ j ∈ A 0 ) partitions the set W, as φ j ii(φ j ) = W as shown in the definition. If w ∈ ii(φ j ), we say that φ j is the smallest formula which w supports (by smallest, we mean that if w also supports φ l , then φ j |= φ l (φ j = φ l )). Therefore, a basic incidence assignment gives a unique mapping relation between each possible world and the smallest formula of all the formulae it supports, for instance, if w supports φ, then w supports φ ∨ ψ 1 , φ ∨ ψ 2 , . . . etc. In a basic incidence assignment, if w ∈ ii(φ), then w ∈ ii(φ ∨ ψ j ). However, an incidence function i maps a possible world w to every formula it supports, i.e., if w ∈ i(φ), then w ∈ i(φ ∨ ψ j ).
In order to see the difference between i and ii, we look at the following example.
Example 3.2. Following the incidence assignment in Example 2.1, the generalized incidence calculus theory is
where W contains seven possible worlds, and µ(w) = 1/7. P = {sunny, windy, rainy} and A = {rainy, windy, rainy ∧ windy, true, false}. 1 The incidence function gives the following incidence sets to the axioms in A. An assignment ii on set A\{ false} can then be defined using Definition 3.2.
ii(rainy ∧ windy) = { fri, mon},
From this ii, the incidence function can be recovered as:
sat in ii(rainy) means that the smallest axiom this possible world supports is rainy. While the smallest axiom that fri supports is rainy ∧ windy although fri ∈ i(rainy) as well.
Function ii defined in this example is a basic incidence function of i based on Definition 3.3, and it is easy to see that the original incidence function i is recoverable from it. In general, is every function ii defined through Definition 3.2 a basic incidence assignment of that incidence function i? If yes, what is the procedure to recover its incidence function? Is the basic incidence assignment of a particular i unique? In the next section, we will answer these questions.
Relationships of Basic Incidence Assignments and Incidence Functions
Basic incidence assignments and incidence functions are all about mapping relations between a set of axioms and a set of possible worlds. A basic incidence assignment maps a possible world uniquely to an axiom while an incidence assignment maps a possible world to all the axioms to which it supports. So what are the general relationships between these two types of assignment? Are the relationships one-to-one, or one-to-many, or even many-to-many? This section goes deeper along this line to see what the answer is.
An Incidence Function has a Unique Basic Incidence Assignment
Algorithm A below constructs a function ii from an incidence function i in a GICT. Theorem 1 confirms that the function ii obtained from Algorithm A is the same as the function ii defined in Definition 3.2 and that this function is unique. Theorem 2 proves that function ii obtained from Algorithm A is a basic incidence assignment and the corresponding incidence function can be recovered from it. Therefore, we conclude that given an incidence function i, there is always a unique basic incidence assignment from which it can be recovered. 
Algorithm A (Extraction of a Function ii). Given a GICT W, µ, P, A, i , function ii on a domain
Therefore, A 0 contains the "smallest" formulae in A and A 0 is not empty. 2 In fact, we can find at least one element belonging to A 0 using the following procedure. For a formula φ ∈ A\{ false}, if ∃ψ i ∈ A, ψ i = φ and ψ i |= φ, then we use ψ i to replace φ and repeat the same procedure 3 until we obtain a formula ψ j and we cannot find any formula which makes ψ j true, then ψ j will be in A 0 .
Step 1: for every formula
Step 3: if A is left with only tautologies, go to Step 6.
Step 4: choose a formula φ l in A which satisfies the requirement that for any
Step 5: delete φ l from A and update A 0 to be
Step 3.
ii(true) represents those possible worlds which only support formula true, and add true to
From this algorithm, we come to Theorem 1 below which proves that function ii obtained in the algorithm is the same as function ii defined in Definition 3.2.
Theorem 1. Given a GICT, W, µ, P, A, i , the function ii constructed from Algorithm A is the unique function satisfying the conditions in Definition 3.2.
Proof: To make the statement clear, we assume that the output of Algorithm A is (A 1 , ii 1 ), where A 1 contains a set of axioms, on which ii 1 is defined, and an output of Definition 3.2 is (A 0 , ii).
(through the reverse of the equation in
Step 4)
Part II: ii 1 is identical with ii: From the proof of Part I, we can see that
We only need to prove that
At the beginning of Algorithm A, we let the smallest axioms from formula (5) be in
We choose an axiom ψ ∈ A 0 \A 1 where for any other ψ j ∈ A 0 \A 1 , if ψ j = ψ, then ψ j |= ψ. Then there is a list of ψ l where ψ l |= ψ , otherwise, ψ in A 1 . Based on Step 4 in Algorithm A, we have
Redefine
Repeat the above procedure for another axiom ψ l in A 0 \A 1 , we will prove that ψ l is in A 1 . So eventually, every formula which is in A 0 is also in A 1 . That is, (A 0 , ii) ⊆ (A 1 , ii 1 ). So A 1 and A 0 are the same set, and ii 1 and ii are identical on this set. Part III: ii is the unique function of this kind: Given an incidence function i on axiom set A, there is only one function ii from i through Definition 3.2. Because an output from Algorithm A is equivalent to a function ii defined from Definition 3.2, and there is only one such ii given an i, there must be only one output from Algorithm A, given a i. Therefore, for a given i, the function ii, either from Algorithm A, or from Definition 3.2, is unique. P Theorem 2. Given a GICT W, µ, P, A, i , the function ii defined on set A 0 obtained from Algorithm A is a basic incidence assignment and function i in the theory can be recovered from it using Eq. (6).
Proof:
Part I: ii is a basic incidence assignment:
we have the following inference procedure.
Contradiction. So the equation ii(φ i ) ∩ ii(φ j ) = { } holds for any two distinct elements φ i and φ j in A 0 . As we also have ii(true) = W\ ∪ j ii(φ j ), when ii(true) = { }, so ii is a basic incidence assignment. Part II: i can be obtained from ii: Now we prove that the incidence function i in W, µ, P, A, i can be derived from ii using Eq. (6) .
For a formula φ ∈ A 0 , there are two situations when φ is added into A 0 .
(1) φ is added into A 0 in Step 1, then
(2) φ is added into A 0 in Steps 4 and 5 when ii(φ) = { }, then
For a formula φ ∈ A\A 0 , if we have ii(φ) = { } at
Step 5, equation
holds. Therefore, no matter in which case, the incidence set i(φ) of φ can always be derived from (A 0 , ii) using Eq. (6) . P Example 4.1 (Simplified from [14] ). Suppose that there are four urns of balls. The balls in the first urn are all Blue, the balls in the second urn are either Blue or Green, the balls in the third urn are all Red and the balls in the fourth urn are either Green or Red. Suppose one ball is drawn from an urn and we are interested in the color of the drawing ball. The following propositions can be included in set P.
The ball is Blue; q 2 : The ball is Blue ∨ Green; q 3 : The ball is Red; q 4 : The ball is Green ∨ Red.
It is possible to establish the supporting relations between the event "drawing a ball from an urn" and the propositions in P using an incidence function i as
where 1, 2, 3, 4 stand for drawing a ball from urns 1, 2, 3 and 4, respectively.
As A function ii on set A\{ false} can be defined through Definition 3.2 and it is a basic incidence assignment.
Where ii(q 4 ) = {4} means that the balls in the fourth urn only support proposition q 4 . The incidence function i on A can be recovered as
Constructing a incidence function i from ii is not difficult if we know the incidence function i first and ii is derived from it. What is the prospect of defining an incidence function i given a basic incidence assignment ii on domain A 0 ? What is the method of finding a domain A, which should be closed under ∧, on which i is defined? We will solve this problem in the next subsection.
A Basic Incidence Assignment Maps to a Family of Incidence Assignments
Example 4.2. Given the following incidence function on a set of axioms A = {windy, rainy, rainy ∧ windy, windy ∨ sunny, rainy ∧ (windy ∨ sunny), true, false} as: This incidence function shares the same basic incidence assignment with the incidence assignment in Example 3.2, but the original sets of axioms are different. The set of axioms in Example 3.2 is a proper subset of the set of axioms in Example 4.2. This suggests that a family of incidence functions may map to a specific basic incidence assignment. So, how to find the smallest set of axioms in a family given (ii, A 0 ) and how to generate other members of this family are the questions we need to answer.
The first theorem below proves the existence of the smallest set of axioms on which an incidence function i is derivable, given a basic incidence assignment, and the second proves that a family of sets of axioms can be generated based on the smallest set of axioms.
Theorem 3. Given a set of axioms A 0 with a basic incidence assignment ii, let
A = A 0 ∪ { false} ∪ {φ | φ = ψ 1 ∧ · · · ∧ ψ n , ψ 1 , . . . , ψ n ∈ A 0 , n > 1}.
Function i defined on A by Eq. (6) is an incidence function.

Proof:
Part I: i is an incidence assignment on A:
As A is defined in the way that it is closed under ∧, we only need to prove that ) . Therefore, the function i defined by (6) is an incidence function.
Part II:
A is the smallest among all possible sets of axioms which are closed under ∧: It is easy to see that A is smallest set which includes A 0 and closed under ∧. P Theorem 4. Given a basic incidence assignment ii on a set of axioms A 0 , let A be the smallest set of axioms defined in Theorem 1, then a set B defined using Eq. (7) below is a member of a family of sets, on which there is an incidence function i B leading to ii.
where ψ ∈ L(P) but ψ ∈ A.
Proof: We need to prove three separate results for this theorem. First, B is closed under ∧. Second, there is an incidence function i B on domain B. Third, the basic incidence assignment of i B is the same as ii.
Part I: B is closed under ∧: Assume that φ 1 and φ 2 are two distinct formulae in B.
(i) if both of these formulae are in A, then φ 1 ∧ φ 2 ∈ A ⊆ B, B is closed. (ii) if both of these formulae are in B \ A, we have
So B is closed under ∧. (iii) if one of these formulae is in B\A, we can use the similar approach as in (ii) to prove that B is closed under ∧.
Therefore, the set constructed using (7) is closed under ∧.
Part II: Incidence function i B , which is closed under ∧ on domain B: Now we define a function i B on B as
where i A is the incidence function on A obtained from Theorem 3. Assume that φ 1 and φ 2 are two distinct formulae in B, we need to prove that
(i) if both of these formulae are in A, then
Therefore, i B is closed under ∧. (iii) Similarly, when only one of these formulae is in B, we can still prove that i B is closed under ∧.
Because true, false ∈ A, we have i B (true) = i A (true) = W and i B ( false) = i A ( false) = { }. Therefore, i B is an incidence function on B.
Part III: The basic incidence assignment of i B is ii on domain A 0 : To prove that ii is a basic incidence assignment of i B , we only need to show that ii(φ) = { } when φ ∈ A.
For any φ ∈ B\A, we have Theorem 3) . Therefore, the basic incidence assignment derived from i B is the same as ii. P
The conclusion we derived from the above two theorems is that a single incidence assignment is mapped to a unique basic incidence assignment and a single basic incidence assignment can be mapped to a family of incidence assignments.
The Method of Recovering an Incidence Function from Numerical Assignments
Given a GICT, the lower bound of probabilities on formulae can be inferred through Eq. (3), when i * is obtained. However, sometimes numerical assignments are given on some formulae directly without defining any incidence functions. We are interested in how to find consistent GICTs in these cases. The central part for achieving this is to define incidence functions which may be derived from a basic incidence assignment. So discovering a basic incidence assignment would be the first step in the whole recovery procedure. In this section, we discuss how to extend Algorithm A to find a basic incidence assignment and its incidence function in these circumstances. 
An Algorithm for Assigning Incidences
Step 2: Choose a formula ψ from A which satisfies the condition that If Prob * (ψ) < 0, this assignment is not consistent, stop the procedure.
Repeat this step until A is left with only tautologies.
Step 3: If j (Prob * (φ j )) < 1, then add a possible world w l+1 to W. Define
ii(true) = {w l+1 }.
Step 
If there are n elements in A then there are at most n + 1 elements in W.
Theorem 5. Given (A, Prob * ) where A is a set of axioms closed under ∧ and Prob * is an assignment of lower bounds of probabilities on A, functions i and ii obtained from Algorithm B are an incidence function and a basic incidence assignment, respectively. The corresponding generalized incidence calculus theory W, µ, P, A, i can produce Prob * on A.
Proof:
Part I: ii and i are respectively basic incidence assignment and incidence function: For any two formulae φ and ψ in A 0 , we have
So ii is a basic incidence assignment. Therefore, i(ψ) = φ j |=ψ ii(φ j ) is an incidence function on A based on Theorem 3.
The corresponding generalized incidence calculus theory is W, µ, P, A, i .
Part II:
The lower bound of probabilities of formulae µ(i * (φ)) is the same as the original numerical assignment Prob * (φ): For any ψ ∈ A, we can calculate the lower bound of its probability, denoted by p i * (in order to distinguish it from Prob * ),.
Therefore, this theory produces the same lower bounds of probabilities for those formulae in A as Prob * . P This algorithm is entirely based on the result that ii(φ) ∩ ii(ψ) = { }. In Algorithm B, for a formula φ, we keep deleting those portions in Prob * (φ) which can be carried by formulae φ j (where φ j |= φ) until we obtain the last part which must be carried by φ itself. This last portion will only be contributed by its basic incidence set.
Unique Output of the Algorithm
In this section we first give an example to demonstrate the use of Algorithm B. The example is reconstructed from [15] . Then we prove that the output of the algorithm is unique regardless of the order of selecting axioms. The set A is closed under the operator ∧. Using Algorithm B, an incidence function is defined from the following steps.
Step 1. The set A 0 is {a ∧ b ∧ c} which contains the smallest formula in A. This means that there is one possible world, w 1 ∈ W, supporting formula a ∧ b ∧ c and µ(w 1 ) = 0.165. We also have
Step 2. Choose formula a∧b from A . Because a∧b∧c is the only formula in A 0 and it has the property that
Repeating this step for each of the remaining elements in A , we get
Also, l = 7. 
Step 4. We obtain W = {w 1 , . . . , w 8 } with probability distribution µ on it. ii is a basic incidence assignment on A 0 . The incidence function derived from i(φ) = φ j |=φ ii(φ j ) on axioms set A is as shown below.
When we apply Algorithm B, there may be more than one formula satisfying the conditions in Step 2, but the order of choosing these formulae has no effect on the final result. In this example, after we choose a ∧ b ∧ c in Step 1 and come to Step 2, it does not matter whether we choose a ∧ b or a ∧ c first. The final result remains the same.
Algorithms A and B were both implemented on a Sun Sparc 4 Workstation in Sicstus Prolog 2. Proof: Assume that A 0 = {φ 1 , . . . , φ k } after Step 1 and there are two formulae ψ 1 , ψ 2 satisfying the condition specified in Step 2.
In Step 1, for every φ j ∈ A 0 , we have
Assume that we choose ψ 1 first in Step 2, then we have
Now we choose ψ 2 and obtain
(because ψ 1 is a smallest formula now)
which indicates that adding ψ 1 into set A 0 has no effect on the outcome of Prob * (ψ 2 ).
In the same way we can prove that choosing ψ 2 first and then ψ 1 gives exactly the same Prob * (ψ 1 ) and Prob * (ψ 2 ) as above. That is, Prob * on set A 0 ∪ {ψ 1 , ψ 2 } remains the same no matter which formula in {ψ 1 , ψ 2 } is chosen first. Similarly, we can prove the theorem for any set of formulae {ψ 1 , . . . , ψ n } satisfying the condition in Step 2. P Applying Algorithm B to (A, Prob * ) only produces one basic incidence assignment, as the order of choosing axioms has no effect on the final output. Through this basic incidence assignment, not only an incidence function can be defined on A, but also a family of incidence assignments can be obtained through Theorem 5, which would share the same set of possible worlds, but with a different set of axioms.
The size of a set of possible worlds created from Algorithm B is related only to the size of the initial set of axioms. What would happen if we have some ideas about the size of a set of possible worlds already (say, a set of possible worlds with 100 elements) and that is larger than the set obtained from Algorithm B? In other words, there may be many pairs, (W j , µ j ), which would generate Prob * on A, as long as an appropriate i is available, as the situations in [5] .
In the next section, the nature of the basic incidence assignment created from Algorithm B will be examined, and this assignment will be compared with any potential consistent assignment, given a numerical assignment on a closed set. The result shows that the pair (W, µ) obtained from Algorithm B subsumes all the possible pairs (W j , µ j ) from other approaches. In another word, given a pair (W j , µ j ), W partitions W j , and for each element A in the partition, there is an element w ∈ W with µ(w) = w j ∈A µ j (w j ).
Comparison with Related Approaches
There are two algorithms in [5, 16] for assigning incidences on axioms based on a probability assignment, one of which is the extension of a method in [6] in the original incidence calculus. The common feature of the two algorithms is that a set of possible worlds has to be fixed first, such as a set of 100 elements, each of which with probability 1/100. Given a set of axioms, both algorithms try to divide possible worlds into groups and assign each group to an axiom. Therefore, not only the number of axioms but also the interrelationship of these axioms affect the division procedure. For instance, assume that there are only two axioms a, b in A, then the assignment procedure could be simply done by choosing two subsets of the set of possible worlds which can produce Prob * (a) and Prob * (b), respectively. However, if Prob * (a ∧ b) is known as well in addition to Prob * (a) and Prob * (b), then we not only need the two subsets of possible worlds W 1 , W 2 to match Prob * (a) and Prob * (b), but also another subset W 3 which matches Prob * (a ∧b) with the condition that
That is, the complexity of these two algorithms increases along with the interrelationship of axioms considerably. Because of this, the order of axioms also affects the efficiency of the algorithms [5, 16] .
In summary, there are three factors associated with the complexity of each algorithm in [5, 16] : the number of axioms, the relations among axioms, and the order of axioms in addition to the requirement of a fixed number of possible worlds. However, in our algorithm, only one factor affects the complexity, that is, the number of axioms. Besides, the new algorithm does not require a set of possible worlds to be predefined.
Example 5.1 has also been tested [5, 16] using the two algorithms, with a predefined set of possible worlds containing 100 elements, each of which with 1/100 probability. Although there are only 8 axioms in A, both algorithms take a long time to find a consistent assignment of incidences (with runtime 374.520 and 355.060 s, respectively). Our algorithm only needs 1.189 (ms) runtime to find a consistent assignment (all these experiments were carried out on Sun Sparc 4 stations in Sicstus Prolog). This example illustrates that the relations among axioms could slow down the algorithms enormously, much worse than the size of set of axioms. In real-world cases, axioms always have some interrelations.
Properties of Basic Incidence Assignments
In [11] , the theoretical background of the basic incidence assignment was investigated to explain why Algorithm B produces only one basic incidence assignment comparing with a large number of outputs from other approaches, and to examine whether Algorithm B has omitted any alternative incidence assignments implied by the numerical assignment.
In this section, we will summarize the research carried out in [11] . We argue that one basic incidence assignment is the only possible outcome of Algorithm B. All the consistent incidence assignments from the numerical assignment can be generated from this unique basic incidence assignment.
Similarity of Separate Incidence Assignments Definition 6.1 (A regular GICT). A GICT W, µ, P,
A, i is said to be regular iff
That is, there are no possible worlds with zero probability. Any GICT can be converted to an equivalent regular theory by simply removing the excess possible worlds with zero probability. For each w with µ(w) = 0, redefine
In the rest of this section, we assume that all GICTs have already been transformed in this way, if necessary, and when we refer to two GICTs as being equal, we mean subject to removal of these possible worlds.
Definition 6.2 (Similarity of possible worlds).
Given an generalized incidence calculus theory (GICT), W, µ, P, A, i , two possible worlds
Clearly, similarity is an equivalence relation. It is reflexive (w ∼ w), symmetric (w 1 ∼ w 2 ⇒ w 2 ∼ w 1 ) and transitive (w 1 ∼ w 2 ∧ w 2 ∼ w 3 ⇒ w 1 ∼ w 3 ) .
Therefore, we can talk about equivalence classes of similar possible worlds, and indeed in any GICT, W will be partitioned by the set of all such classes.
Definition 6.3 (Fundamental generalized incidence calculus theory (GICT)).
A GICT, W, µ, P, A, i , is fundamental iff it has no distinct similar possible worlds. That is, iff
Definition 6.4 (Direct subsumption of GICT). A GICT, W , µ , P, A, i , is directly subsumed by W, µ, P, A, i iff
• For some w 1 , w 2 ∈ W with w 1 ∼ w 2 and some
In this definition, the fact that w 1 ∈ i (φ) will imply that w 2 ∈ i (φ), since w 1 ∼ w 2 . So a subsumption replaces two possible worlds which occur in the same set of incidences with a single possible world whose probability is the sum of the probabilities of the previous two.
Definition 6.5 (Subsumption of GICTs). A GICT
It is worth pointing out that the list can be singleton. That is any GICT subsumes itself.
Theorem 7. A fundamental GICT can only be subsumed by itself.
Proof: Assume that a GICT subsumes a fundamental one, then there will be a chain of direct subsumption between the two. A direct subsumption acts on a pair of similar worlds in a GICT, but there can be no such pair in a fundamental theory and so the chain must have zero length. Therefore, the fundamental GICT is subsumed by itself. P Since probabilities of formulae (or lower bounds of probabilities, to be precise) are calculated through the incidence sets of these formulae, we can have the following statement.
If
where µ applied to a set is the sum of the results of applying µ to the individual members of that set.
Theorem 8. Subsumption preserves lower bounds of probability.
Proof: As a subsumption is purely made of a series of direct subsumptions, it is sufficient to show that direct subsumption preserves lower bounds of probability. This, however, is not difficult, as Prob * (i(φ)) = µ(i(φ)). Let W, µ, P, A, i directly subsume W , µ , P, A, i . Let w be the new possible world, which is introduced in Definition 6.4. Now, if
If, on the other hand, w ∈ i (φ), then
Note that because subsumption preserves lower bounds of probabilities in the above way, is also preserves similarity of possible worlds. To illustrate this, we will define the function of occurrence.
Definition 6.6 (Occurrence function).
In a GICT, W, µ, P, A, i , the occurrence (o) is a function mapping the possible worlds (in W) to the subsets of the axioms (in ∧(A), which means that A is closed under ∧) defined by
So the occurrence of a possible world is the set of axioms in whose incidence sets it occurs. It is then trivial to show from Definition 6.2, that
Subsumption preserves occurrence (and hence similarity) since a possible world in a subsumption theory will either have existed in the original GICT with the same occurrence, or it will have replaced two similar possible worlds. In this later case, the occurrence of the new possible world will (by Definitions 6.4 and 6.5) be the same as that of the first two, and it will therefore be similar to any other possible world which was similar to the first two.
Definition 6.7 (Fundamental Subsumption).
A GICT has a fundamental subsumption iff it is subsumed by a fundamental GICT.
Theorem 9. Fundamental subsumption is unique up to renaming.
Proof: Let us assume that a GICT, W, µ, P, A, i , is subsumed by two fundamental GICTs, W 1 , µ 1 , P, A, i 1 and W 2 , µ 2 , P, A, i 2 . We must provide an isomorphism between these to show that they are unique up to renaming. Clearly, the sets of atomic propositions and axioms are the same in both cases.
Each direct subsumption acts on a pair of similar possible worlds, and replaces that pair with a single possible world. As stated earlier, subsumption preserves similarity of possible worlds. That is for any equivalence class of ∼ and a direct subsumption acting on two possible worlds in it, the equivalence structure will be retained, with the substitution of the new possible world for the old two. A fundamental subsumption continues this process until each equivalence class is reduced to a single element; if any has more than one, the GICT is not fundamental as similarities exist, and none can be reduced to zero. If the number of equivalence classes in W is n, then the number of elements in both W 1 and W 2 will therefore also be n. We form an isomorphism between the two sets of possible worlds based on the original equivalence classes; an element w 1 ∈ W 1 is mapped to w 2 ∈ W 2 when w 1 and w 2 are subsumed from the same equivalence class in W.
By Definition 6.4, µ 1 and µ 2 of each element will be the same of µ applied to all members of the corresponding equivalence set. As this original set is the same for both cases, µ 1 and µ 2 are isomorphic. i 1 and i 2 are also isomorphic, this is clear as subsumption is incidence preserving. P
Theorem 10. Every GICT is subsumed by a fundamental GICT.
Proof: Let W, µ, P, A, i be a GICT. If it is fundamental, then it subsumes itself and we are done.
If it is not fundamental, then there are two possible worlds, w 1 , w 2 ∈ W such that w 1 ∼ w 2 . We can therefore define a new GICT W , µ , P, A, i which directly subsumes our original theory (by Definition 6.4). Clearly, if W , µ , P, A, i directly subsumes W, µ, P, A, i , then W has one less element than W. We can continue this process of direct subsumption, reducing the size of W at every step. As W is finite, and GICTs with less than two possible worlds are necessarily fundamental, we will eventually reach a fundamental GICT, which will subsume the original GICT by the definition of subsumption as a chain of direct subsumptions. P So we have now shown that every GICT is subsumed by one and only one fundamental GICT. We are now ready to define our equivalence relation on GICTs. It is clear that this is an equivalence relation, since every GICT is subsumed by itself, it is reflexive; the symmetricity is trivial; and the transitivity again follows trivially from the above results.
Definition 6.8 (Similarity of GICTs
Fundamental Nature of Basic Incidence Assignment
Based on previous discussion, it is therefore necessary to prove that a GICT derived from applying the basic incidence assignment algorithm is fundamental. We must, before attempting to prove this, address the problem of possible worlds with zero probability. Algorithm B has ensured that no such possible worlds would have been created. So the derived GICT is a regular one. Proof: Given a numerical assignment on a set of axioms A, which is closed under ∧, Algorithm B will produce a basic incidence assignment ii on A 0 (A 0 ⊆ A).
A number of incidence assignments can be derived from this basic incidence assignment on different sets of axioms (Theorems 3 and 4), where A is the smallest set among all of them. We need to prove that every such derived GICT is fundamental to that family of GICTs which have the same set of axioms. To do this, we only need to take the GICT with A as the set of axioms as an example, as others can be proved similarly. So we need to prove that GICT, W, µ, P, A, i , derived from the basic incidence assignment ii on A 0 (A 0 ⊆ A) is fundamental to all other GICTs in the form W j , µ j , P, A, i j which share A but with different sets of possible worlds and probability distributions.
To prove this, we must show that no two distinct possible worlds in this GICT are similar-that is, for every pair of possible worlds w 1 , w 2 , there must be at least one φ ∈ A such that either w 1 
For simplicity, we will take w 1 , w 2 to be ordered so that w 1 was created before w 2 in the algorithm. From the procedure of the algorithm, we know that there is a formula φ 1 ∈ A, that ii(φ 1 ) = {w 1 }, and likewise for w 2 . Clearly w 1 ∈ i(φ 1 ). We will show that w 2 ∈ i(φ 1 ), which is sufficient, as w 1 , w 2 are arbitrary.
In Algorithm B, we have
So w 2 ∈ i(φ 1 ) means that ii(φ l ) = {w 2 } for a specific φ l , because of the property of basic incidence
implies that φ l |= φ 1 . However, if φ l |= φ 1 , then φ 1 should not have been selected before φ l , which contradicts the choice of w 2 . Therefore this GICT is fundamental.
Similarly, as every other GICT derived from this basic incidence assignment has the same set of possible worlds, every such GICT must be fundamental. P So, we have shown that every GICT is subsumed by a fundamental one, and that GICTs derived from Algorithm B are fundamental. What we have to show next is that any GICT derived from any other incidence assignment approach is subsumed by a GICT from Algorithm B, given (A, Prob * ), where A is closed as usual. ) . In a GICT, the strict incidence set of a subset of axioms is the intersection of the incidence sets of all the axioms in the subset with the complement of the incidence sets of all the axioms not in the subset. In other words, for a subset A of set A,
Definition 6.9 (Strict Incidence Set
Intuitively, the strict incidence set of a set of axioms is the set of possible worlds in which those axioms, and only those axioms, are true.
Definition 6.10 (Basic Probability Portion).
Given a GICT W, µ, P, A, i , assume that ii is the basic incidence assignment derived from i on domain A 0 , then probability µ(ii(φ)) for φ ∈ A 0 is called the basic probability portion carried by φ, denoted as bp(φ). For any ψ ∈ A\A 0 , we define bp(ψ) = 0.
Clearly, following Definitions 3.3 and 6.10, we have
This means that the basic probability portion of an axiom is the portion in its lower bound of probability that is carried by the axiom, which cannot be obtained from other axioms. Assume that the corresponding GICTs of all consistent incidence assignments discovered from many other approaches are in set Q. Further assume that a subset of Q is Q 1 containing those GICTs which all have a comment set of axioms A. Then we need to prove that this smallest theory is the only fundamental GICT subsumes all GICTs in Q 1 . Similarly, we can prove that each GICT in Q \ Q 1 is subsumed by a GICT obtained through Theorem 4.
Corollary 1. Given a GICT, assume that the basic incidence assignment from it is ii on domain
Part I: Now, we will prove that the smallest GICT is the only fundamental GICT among all GICTs in Q 1 .
Assume that we have a noncontradictory lower bound Prob * of a probability distribution on a finite set of n axioms A, which is closed under conjunction. The consistency of the lower bound ensures that a consistent incidence assignment is derivable from Algorithm B, which is fundamental. We must now show that it is unique.
If there are n axioms in A, then there are at most n − 1 possible worlds being created in Algorithm B. Each possible world w makes ii(φ) = {w} true (for a φ) and none for false. If the basic incidence assignment ii is defined on domain A 0 , then bp(φ) = µ(w) for φ ∈ A 0 and ii(φ) = {w}.
We now choose a GICT from Q 1 arbitrarily, say
There is a unique basic incidence assignment ii 1 derivable from i 1 . We assume ii 1 is defined on domain A 1 . Then based on Definition 6.10, we have bp
However, as bp and bp 1 both define basic probability portions on axioms from the same consistent probability distribution, bp(φ) must be the same as bp 1 (φ). Therefore, A 0 and A 1 specify the same set of axioms, for each of which the basic probability portion is not zero. That is,
In other words, we have In summary, any GICT in Q 1 , W 1 , µ 1 , P, A, i 1 , is either identical with the smallest GICT, when the former is also a fundamental one, or subsumed by the smallest GICT. So the smallest GICT is the unique fundamental GICT subsumes all the GICTs in Q 1 .
Part II: Similarly, we can prove that any GICT from any incidence assignment approach is either identical with a GICT derived from Theorem 4 or subsumed by it.
Therefore, there is only one fundamental GICT for that family of GICTs which all have the same set of axioms, and the fundamental one is the one derived from the basic incidence assignment approach. P So, we have proved that for any lower bound of a consistent probability distribution on a set of axioms closed under conjunction, there is a unique fundamental incidence assignment and that this assignment is the one found by Algorithm B. Under this condition, any consistent incidence assignment produced by [5] is equivalent to the one produced in this paper, furthermore, any consistent assignment produced by any method will be subsumed by this fundamental one. As there are an infinite number of such assignment (take any possible world and divide it into two, each with half the probability and repeat the procedure), Algorithm B is simpler than other approaches.
Extending the Result to DS Theory and Probability Spaces
One of the meaningful extensions of Algorithm B is to determine whether a numerical distribution is a belief function (in DS theory) when A is the whole language set L(P), and to determine the mass function when it is. The algorithm can also be used to recover the corresponding probability space when Prob * is thought of as an inner measure (or a lower bound) on A in probability structures [10, 12] .
Deriving Mass Functions in DS Theory
DS Theory.
In DS theory, a piece of evidence is always described on a special set, called a frame of discerment , which contains mutually exclusive and exhaustive answers for a question. This piece of evidence can either be in the form of a mass function, denoted as m, or in the form of a belief function, denoted as bel. The conditions for these two functions are
where n = | |.
The relationship between a belief function and its mass function is unique. They can be recovered from each other as follows. 
Relationships Between Mass Functions and Basic Incidence Assignments.
Incidence calculus is about calculating incidences and bounds of probabilities on formulae while DS theory is about calculating beliefs on subsets of a set. To establish some relationships between the two theories, we need to find a common domain to which both theories can talk. In Section 2, the basic element set, At, of a given set of atomic propositions P is defined. At satisfies the definition of a frame of discernment, so it is a frame of discernment and both belief functions and mass functions can be defined on it. Following the one-to-one relationship between 2
At and L(P) in Definition 2.3, we can map each formula φ to a subset of At and denote this subset as A φ .
Therefore, given a belief function bel on At, we can define a belief function on L(P) as bel (φ) = bel(A φ ), where A φ ⊆ At and φ = ∨δ i , δ i ∈ A φ . Therefore, we can also talk about a belief function on a language set L(P).
Let W, µ, P, A, i be a GICT, and ii be the corresponding basic incidence assignment on A 0 . Then If we define m(φ) = µ(ii(φ)), m is a mass function and the elements in A 0 are in fact the corresponding focal elements. So if we can discover a basic incidence assignment, we can also discover a mass function. This result also supports what we have proved in [13] .
Deriving Mass Functions
Based on the discussion in the previous subsection, in the following we show an alternative way to derive a mass function from a numerical assignment by means of incidence calculus, when this assignment is a belief function. This is described in Algorithm C below. ) . Given a numerical assignment Prob * on the set A = L(P), determine whether Prob * is a belief function on this language set 4 and obtain its mass function if it is.
Algorithm C (Deriving Mass Functions
Step 1: Delete all those elements in A in which Prob * ( * ) = 0. Similar to the action in Algorithm B, define a subset A 0 out of A using formula (5) . The algorithm tries to find the focal elements of a belief function one by one. Once all the focal elements are found and the uncertain values of these elements are defined, the corresponding mass function is known. 
Recovering Probability Spaces
In [10, 12] , Fagin and Halper suggested a method to assign probability measures on formulae instead of on sets. In this method, given a probability space (W, χ, µ), 5 an inner measure on a propositional language set L(P) can be defined through a truth assignment π(w) : L(P) → {true, false} as follows. If π(w)(φ) = true, φ is said to be true at w; otherwise we say that φ is false at w. φ π is defined to contain all those elements in W in which φ is true. If we define Prob * (φ) = µ * (φ π ) where µ * is the inner measure of µ, then Prob * is called an inner measure of a probability distribution on L(P). It is proved in [12] that a belief function on such a language set is also an inner measure, which is generated from a probability space. Therefore, it is also interesting to apply the above technique to recover a probability space when we know an inner measure Prob * of probabilities on L(P).
Algorithm D (Recovering Probability Spaces).
Given an inner measure Prob * on the set A = L(P), recover the initial probability space from which Prob * is derived.
Step 1: Delete all those elements in A in which Prob * ( * ) = 0. Similar to the initial step in Algorithm B, define a subset A 0 out of A using formula (5) . For every φ j ∈ A 0 , define π(w j )(φ j ) = true and µ(w j ) = Prob * (φ j ) = Prob * (φ j ). If Prob * (φ) < 0 then this assignment is not a correct inner measure, stop the procedure.
Repeat this step until A is empty.
Step 3: Set χ = {{w 1 }, . . . , {w l+1 }} is the basis of an unspecified probability space. It is easy to prove that w j µ(w j ) = 1.
The corresponding probability space will be (W, χ, µ) where χ is the σ -algebra generated by the basis χ . In the simplest case, the probability space can just be (χ , χ , µ).
Through Theorem 3, we can prove that from probability space (χ , χ, µ) and mapping π, the lower bound Porb * on L(P) can be recalculated.
More details about probability space, probability structure and its relation with DS theory can be found in [10, 12] . Example 7.2. Continuing Example 7.1, if we take Prob * as an inner measure of a probability measure on A from an unknown probability space, this space can be recovered as (W, χ , µ) where the basis for χ is χ = {{w 1 }, {w 2 }, {w 3 }}, and µ(w 1 ) = 0.5, µ(w 2 ) = 0.3, µ(w 3 ) = 0.2.
Summary
Dealing with uncertainty is an important task in many automated reasoning systems. Quite a few numerical and symbolic approaches have been proposed and discussed [1, 9, [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] . Incidence calculus is one among these. The main difference between incidence calculus
